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In this work, depreciated effect of the public goods is considered in the public goods games,
which is realized by rescaling the multiplication factor r of each group as r′ = r(nc
G
)β (β ≥ 0). It
is assumed that each individual enjoys the full profit of the public goods if all the players of this
group are cooperators, otherwise, the value of the public goods is reduced to r′. It is found that
compared with the original version (β = 0), emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted for
β > 0, and there exit optimal values of β inducing the best cooperation. Moreover, the optimal
plat of β broadens as r increases. Furthermore, effect of noise on the evolution of cooperation is
studied, it is presented that variation of cooperator density with the noise is dependent of the value
of β and r, and cooperation dominates over most of the range of noise at an intermediate value of
β = 1.0. We study the initial distribution of the multiplication factor at β = 1.0 , and find that all
the distributions can be described as Gauss distribution.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory [1–7]is widely applied to
study the maintenance of cooperation among the self-
ish individuals. The prisoners’ dilemma game (PDG) by
pairwise interaction [8–10] and public goods game (PGG)
by group interaction [11] have been extensively used to
investigate the altruistic behavior. In a classical pub-
lic goods game, N players are selected randomly from a
large population, and each player has two choices: co-
operation and defection. A cooperator will contribute
a mount cost to the public pool, while a defector con-
tributes nothing. The accumulative contribution is mul-
tiplied by a factor r, then redistributed equally among
all the players. In a well-mixed population, it leads to a
rock-scissors-paper dynamics when loner strategy is in-
troduced [12]. Considering the limitation of the classical
game theory, some mechanisms and theoretical supple-
ment are proposed, such as reputation and punishment
[13–18], network reciprocity [12, 19–22], voluntary par-
ticipation [23–25].
Diversity or the inhomogeneity has been studied in
many works, which mainly focuses on the network topol-
ogy diversity or individual inhomogeneity [26–30]. San-
tos et al. have introduced social diversity by means of
heterogeneous graphs, and concluded that cooperation
is promoted by the diversity associated with the num-
ber and the size of the public goods game, as well as
the individual contribution to each group [22]. Consid-
ering the profit diversity of the public goods in reality,
group diversity is introduced in the public goods game
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in which r follows a given distribution among the popu-
lation [31]. However, in real situations, the value of the
public goods is not invariable, but evolves because of the
external conditions or the reasons of themselves. In this
work, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spa-
tial public goods games by considering the depreciated
effect of public goods. It is assumed that each individual
enjoys the full advantage of the public goods if all the
people are cooperators in a single group, otherwise, the
value of the multiplication factor of this group is reduced
as a function of r(nc
G
)β . No qualitative change happens
when altering the initial distribution of the cooperators.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, de-
scription of the model is proposed in detail. Numerical
simulations and the correspondent analysis are presented
in section III. Conclusions are drawn in the Section IV.
II. MODELS
Public goods game is studied on a square lattice with
periotic boundary conditions. Each player can either
cooperate or defect, and interacts with its nearest four
neighbors. Here each individual only participates in a
SINGLE group. Considering the depreciated effect of
the public goods, the multiplication factor rx of the group
centered on individual x is rescaled as
r′x = r(
ncx
G
)β (1)
where r is the multiplication factor indicating the full
profit of the public goods of each group. ncx denotes
the number of cooperators in this group, and G (=5)
is the group size. β ≥ 0 is a tunable parameter, and
when β = 0, the system returns to the original version in
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Cooperator density ρc as a function of
multiplication factor r for different values of β.
which r is invariable and same in each group. The payoff
of player x is given by
Px = r
′
x
ncx
G
− sx, (2)
where sx indicates the strategy of x, sx=1 for a coop-
erator, and 0 for a defector.
After each time step, a player x will update its strategy
by choosing a neighbor y randomly from the neighbor-
hood. We adopt the updating rule depending on their
total payoff difference,
W (sx → sy) =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/κ]
, (3)
where κ denotes the amplitude of noise level. Here we
set κ = 0.1.
III. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
Simulations are carried out for a population of N =
200×200 individuals with the synchronous updating rule.
Initially, the two strategies of cooperation (C) and defec-
tion (D) are randomly distributed with the equal proba-
bility of 1/2. The key quantity for characterizing the co-
operative behavior is the density of cooperators ρc, which
is defined as the fraction of cooperators in the whole pop-
ulation. In the all simulations, ρc is obtained by averag-
ing over the last 5000 Monte Carlo (MC) time steps of
the total 45000. Each data point results from an average
of 50 realizations.
Figure 1 shows the variation of ρc with r for different
values of β. One can see that ρc increases with r for
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Variation of ρc with β for different
values of r.
each β, and emergence of cooperation is remarkably pro-
moted compared with the original version (β=0). More-
over, β=1.0 induces the best promotion, which suggests
that there exit optimal values of β for the evolution of
cooperation.
Then we study the effect of β on evolution of coop-
eration in Fig. 2 for different values of r. It is shown
that for each value of r, there exit intermediate values
of β leading to the highest cooperative level, and mean-
while, optimal plat of β is formed which broadens as r
increases. Moreover, we can also conclude that the initial
distribution of r has a critical impact on the evolution of
cooperation from Fig. 2. It is shown that δ (β = 0)
or polarized (β → ∞) distribution has an adverse effect
on evolution of cooperation, which is consistent with the
results in the previous work.
Before we further study, it is necessary to explain the
results gained above. It is known that group diversity
can promote cooperation in the public goods games in
which the multiplication factor r follows a given distri-
bution [31]. In our model, diversity of group forms when
β > 0 according to equation (1), and meanwhile, the
diversity is not fixed, but evolves with the time step as
cooperation evolves. The spatio-temporal diversity con-
tributes to the spread of cooperation, and thereby better
promotes the cooperative level than the fixed spatial di-
versity. Because in the fixed distribution of diversity, the
players in disadvantageous group with very small values
of r will always give up cooperating (see reference [31]).
Figure 3 shows the time evolution of cooperation for
different values of β at r=4.5. It is found that for small β
(β=0.2), cooperative clusters are formed, and sustained
as small sizes; when β is moderate, large clusters are
formed, and are spreading over all the population as t
evolves. While for the large values of β, cooperative clus-
ters can’t be sustained, and gradually exploited by the
3FIG. 3: Time evolution of spatial distributions of coopera-
tors (white) and defectors (black) at r=4.5 for (a) β=0.2, (b)
β=1.0, (c) β=1.8. The initial distribution of cooperators is
uniform distribution for each condition.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Cooperator density ρc as a function
of noise amplitude κ for different values of β at r=4.0, 4.5,
5.0, 5.5 respectively.
defectors with the time step.
We further investigate the impact of noise on the evo-
lution of cooperation in Fig. 4 for different values of r.
Apparently, the variation tendency of cooperator density
ρc with κ not only depends on the value of r, but also
has the relation with the value of β: when r is too small
or too large, ρc decreases with κ for each β, while for
a moderate value of r, ρc plays nonmonotonic behavior
at some value of β (e.g., see r=4.5 at β=0.2). It should
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Initial distribution of r′ at β = 1.0 for
different values of r. Here κ=0.1.
be also noted that cooperation almost dominates at an
intermediate value of β=1.0 for each r.
Given that the initial distribution of the group diver-
sity plays an important part on the evolution of cooper-
ation, we study the initial distribution of multiplication
factor r′ for different values of r at β = 1.0 (see Fig.
5) in order to figure out why β=1.0 has such an advan-
tageous status in Fig. 4. It is surprisingly found that
all the initial distribution can be described as Gauss dis-
tribution, which implies that Gauss distribution has an
positive effect on the evolution of cooperation.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, evolution of cooperation was investigated
in the spatial public goods games by considering the ef-
fect of depreciation of the public goods. We assumed that
each individual enjoys the full profit of the public goods
if all the players of this group are cooperators, otherwise,
the value of public goods is depreciated, which is realized
by rescaling the multiplication factor r of this group to
r(ncx
G
)β . So that spatial diversity of the multiplication
factor is formed among the population, and meanwhile,
evolves with the time step as the cooperation evolves.
We found that compared with the original version for
β = 0, cooperative level is largely improved when β > 0,
and there exist moderate values of β leading to a best
cooperation. Moreover, optimal flat of β are formed, and
broadens as r increases. The facilitation of cooperation
should be attributed to the spatio-temporal diversity of
the multiplication factor caused by the depreciated ef-
fect of the public goods: spatial diversity stimulates the
emergence of cooperation, whereas temporal diversity of
r contributes to the spread of cooperation. Furthermore,
noise impact on the evolution of cooperation was studied,
it was proved that the variation of cooperation density
4not only depends on the values of r, but also has a close
relation with the values of β. We also noted that there
exits an intermediate value of β = 1.0 inducing the best
cooperation over most of the range of noise. In order to
explain this phenomenon, initial distribution of multipli-
cation factor at β = 1.0 is studied. It was shown that
all the distribution can be depicted by the Gauss distri-
bution, which suggested that Gauss distribution has a
positive effect on the evolution of cooperation.
Our work reiterates the importance of the diversity on
the evolution of cooperation, and meanwhile, that Gauss
distribution has such an advantageous status may give us
some inspiration to study the cooperation in a different
way.
This work is funded by the National Basic Research
Program of China (973 Program No. 2006CB705500),
the National Important Research Project: (Study on
emergency management for non-conventional happened
thunderbolts, Grant No. 91024026), the National Natu-
ral Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 10975126,
10635040), the Specialized Research Fund for the Doc-
toral Program of Higher Education of China (Grant No.
20093402110032).
[1] K. G. Binmore, Playing Fair: Game Theory and the So-
cial Contract (MIT, Cambridge, 1994).
[2] A. M. Colman, Game Theory and Its Applications in the
Social and Biological Sciences (Butterworth-Heinemann,
Oxford, 1995).
[3] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, The Theory of Evolution
and Dynamical Systems (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1988)
[4] H. Gintis, Game Theory Evolving (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 2000).
[5] M. A. Nowak, Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the
Equations of Life (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 2006).
[6] G. Szabo´ and G. Fa´th, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007).
[7] M. A. Nowak, Science 314, 1560 (2006).
[8] R. Axelrod, W.D. Hamilton, Science 211 1390 (1981).
[9] F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
098104 (2005).
[10] G. Szabo´, J. Vukov, and A. Szolnoki, Phys. Rev. E 72,
047107 (2005).
[11] J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, The Handbook of Experi-
mental Economics, (Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, 1995).
[12] G. Szabo´ and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 118101
(2002).
[13] E. Fehr and S. Gachter, Nature (London) 415, 137
(2002).
[14] R. Boyd, H. Gintis, S. Bowles, and P. J. Richerson, Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 100, 3531 (2003).
[15] M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund, Nature (London) 437,
1291 (2005).
[16] A. Traulsen and M. A. Nowak, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 103, 10952 (2006).
[17] C. Hauert, A. Traulsen, H. Brandt, M. A. Nowak, and
K. Sigmund, Science 316, 1905 (2007).
[18] H. Ohtsuki, Y. Iwasa, and M. A. Nowak, Nature (Lon-
don) 457, 79 (2009).
[19] M. A. Nowak and R. M. May, Nature (London) 359, 826
(1992).
[20] C. Hauert and M. Doebeli, Nature (London) 428, 643
(2004).
[21] F. C. Santos, J. M. Pacheco, and T. Lenaerts, Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 103, 3490 (2006).
[22] F. C. Santos, M. D. Santos, and J. M. Pacheco, Nature
(London) 454, 213 (2008).
[23] C. Hauert, S. D. Monte, J. Hofbauer, and K. Sigmund,
J. Theor. Biol. 218, 187 (2002).
[24] G. Szabo´ and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev. E 66, 062903 (2002).
[25] C. Hauert, M. Holmes, and M. Doebeli, Proc. R. Soc.
London, Ser. B 273, 2565 (2006).
[26] J. Y. Guan, Z. X. Wu and Y. H. Wang, Phys. Rev. E,
76, 056101 (2007) .
[27] A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, New J. Phys., 10, 043036
(2008).
[28] A. Szolnoki, M. Perc and G. Szabo´, Eur. Phys. J. B, 61,
505 (2008) .
[29] H. X. Yang, W. X. Wang, Z. X. Wu, Y. C. Lai and B. H.
Wang , Phys. Rev. E, 79, 056107 (2009) .
[30] M. Perc and A. Szolnoki, Phys. Rev. E, 77, 011904
(2008).
[31] D. M. Shi, Y. Zhuang and B. H. Wang, EPL 90, 58003
(2010).
